We build a stylised 12-country model of the euro area and use it to analyse how differences in national inflation and growth rates arise within the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). We find that the main source of differentials in the early years of the EMU have been aggregate demand shocks, followed by cost-push shocks; euro exchange rate shocks come third. Among the propagation mechanisms a key role is played by inflation persistence; for plausible parameter values even small changes in persistence can produce a dramatic increase in the differentials. Finally, we also find that a tight control of average area-wide inflation around a target tends to reduce the differentials as well.
Introduction
Several years after the launch of the euro, the inflation differences among euro area countries are still the focus of much debate. After converging sharply in the 1990s, national inflation rates started to diverge again in 1999; since then, the standard deviation of the annual inflation rates among euro area members has fluctuated around 1 percent.
1 Two questions arise in this context. The first is what generates these differences: separate national monetary policies, the consensus explanation before 1999, can no longer be the reason now. The second is how, and how quickly, these inflation differences are reabsorbed in the absence of separate monetary policies; in other words, how well does the adjustment mechanism in the single currency area operate.
Differences in local inflation and cycles are not unusual in large currency areas, but there are reasons why those in the euro area deserve particular attention. First, goods and labour markets in Europe are still only partially integrated. The single market legislation has been in place for over a decade, and the single currency will help integration further; but this takes time, and in the meantime the euro area countries will remain more prone to different price and output developments than, for example, U.S. States and regions are. Second, most of the factors giving rise to such differences depend on policies under national control (budgetary and tax policies; competition policies in both the wholesale and the retail sectors; labour market regulations; and so on). There is no reason to expect that these policies will systematically be conducted so as to smooth price or output differentials. Third, political economy considerations arise because of the euro area's institutional features. Inflation is unpopular, especially if it cannot be mitigated by a weaker exchange rate. National public opinion and politicians may misinterpret its causes and blame the currency instead. National differences also make the interpretation of euro area indicators more challenging for the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB), which is mandated to set monetary policy for the area as a whole.
Some recent papers have provided useful elements to understand the origin of inflation differences in EMU, but on the whole the available analyses on this important issue remain limited. In this paper we try to make progress by building a simple but realistic multi-country model of the euro area and using it to investigate the sources of differences in inflation and other cyclical variables. Our 1 A standard deviation of one percent is quite large, particularly if the differences are persistent. To get an idea of the orders of magnitude consider for example a union of twelve countries, six of which have an inflation rate close to the area average, while three and three deviate upward and downward, respectively, by the same amount, so that the overall standard deviation is one percent. If the differentials persist for five years (not an unusual pattern as we shall see), the three high inflation countries will eventually cumulate a competitiveness loss of some 13 percent relative to the rest of the area, and 20 percent relative to their low inflation partners.
approach departs from the literature, where two directions have been pursued: 1) descriptive analyses, supported by correlation or regression results; 2) small calibrated models with microeconomic foundation, used to illustrate certain theoretical properties of currency unions through stylised examples. Each of these lines of research alone is insufficient, we think. On the one hand descriptive analysis has probably reached a point of diminishing returns due to the scarcity of data. On the other, existing small micro-founded models, normally assuming two countries only, provide only partial answers. Inflation differentials are ultimately an empirical issue because they depend on the balance of countervailing forces, some generating or amplifying the differentials, others pushing towards reequilibrium. The dimension of heterogeneity is also likely to depend on the number of countries (substantially more than the 2 usually modelled) and on their economic structures (on which there is information from previous empirical work, which can be used). A full micro-founded model remains the ultimate goal; we see our model as a step in that direction. Our model includes 12 countries, each represented by an aggregate demand and an aggregate supply equation. Inflation differentials across countries, originating from nation-specific shocks, cumulate into changes in external competitiveness, which give rise to international trade spillovers. Inflation differentials also cause, under a single monetary policy, different national shortterm real interest rates, which affect domestic aggregate demand in each country differently. The two mechanisms balance each other in a dynamic equilibrium whose characteristics depend on the model's parameter values. Our strategy is to identify plausible parameter ranges and then use the model to analyse the inflation differentials, focusing mainly on two aspects: first, the contribution of the different sources of shocks to the differentials; second, the sensitivity of inflation differentials to changes in the key parameters describing the model's propagation mechanism. In extreme synthesis, our results indicate, first, that the main source of the differentials is given by national aggregate demand (or potential output) disturbances (we do not distinguish between the two), followed by domestic costpush disturbances; area-wide exchange rate shocks come third. Second, concerning the propagation mechanism we find that inflation persistence potentially plays a central role in amplifying and perpetuating inflation differentials within the currency area. As a by-product, we also examine how the area-wide monetary policy affects inflation dispersion and find an interesting complementarity: minimising the deviations of area-wide inflation from its longrun level also helps keeping inflation differentials low.
The paper is organised as follows: we first review the main stylised facts and the relevant literature (Section 2). We then present our model (Section 3). Next we validate the model by seeing how it replicates the basic stylised facts and use it to decompose the differentials according to the sources of the shocks (Section 4).
Following this, we undertake a sensitivity analysis of how the differentials (size and duration) are affected by the key model parameters (Section 5). Finally, we look at the role of monetary policy (Section 6) and, to complete, we examine how alternative assumptions concerning exchange rate determination affect the stability and determinacy properties of our model (Section 7). Section 8 concludes.
Stylised facts and related literature
Inflation differentials among the prospective euro area countries declined steadily in the 1990-99 period, as shown in Figure 1 . The unweighted standard deviation of the annual growth rates of the harmonised CPI reached a minimum at about 1 percent in 1999. After that it edged up again and then tended to oscillate around or slightly above 1 percent. Note: The chart shows the unweighted standard deviation of national inflation rates in the euro area and of regional inflation rates in Spain, Germany and Italy.
The figure also shows the comparison with the inflation divergence among regions within some of the euro area countries. It is apparent that inflation divergence among European regions within individual states tends to be smaller than those observed among euro area nations. Another comparison that can be made is with the differentials among the 14 U.S. "metropolitan areas" (Figure 2) . Interestingly, the inflation divergence among U.S. cities was more or less constant for many years at around 1 percent, i.e. about the same level reached by the euro area in 1999. The analogy is probably misleading, however: U.S. cities are smaller than EU nations, and their price indices tend to be more volatile. An alternative comparison is that with the U.S. Census regions. According to this measure, inflation discrepancy in the United States is lower, typically around 0.5 or less. The proper term of comparison for euro area countries should be something between U.S. cities and U.S. macro regions, probably closer to the latter. States, 1990 States, -2003 Note: The chart shows the unweighted standard deviation of national inflation rates in the euro area, of inflation rates in 14 metropolitan statistical areas and of 4 census regions in the United States.
Another distinctive feature of euro area inflation differentials is their persistence. Table 1 shows that national inflation tends to remain on the same side relative to the area average for several years, unlike in the United States, where each region has changed sides in the last few years at least once. Several factors have been invoked to explain the size and the dynamics of the inflation differentials in the early years of the euro area. First, at the initial stages of the currency union inflation rates could diverge because of a "catch-up" mechanism from initially different price levels. This explanation, emphasised by a number of authors in recent years, 2 could in principle account for both the differentials and their persistence. If imbalances in initial prices exist, perhaps due to differences in productivity levels (Balassa-Samuelson effects), it would probably take years before they are reabsorbed; until then, countries with lower initial price and productivity levels would systematically have above-average inflation rates. However, there is evidence that the Balassa-Samuelson effect can provide only a partial explanation for the persistence of euro area inflation differentials. An inflation accounting exercise shows that differences in labour productivity trends across euro area countries contribute to inflation diversity, yet can only account for a relatively moderate share (ECB 2005) .
Any differentials due to the factors just described would be temporary; on the contrary, other sources of differentials, like idiosyncratic demand and supply factors affecting individual countries relative to the average, should persist in equilibrium. The ECB (2003) recently published a qualitative survey of price and cost developments in EU-12 during 1999-2002 and related macroeconomic developments to shed light on what these other sources may be. Several useful indications emerge. In particular, inflation differentials are larger in the services sector but are also present, with broadly similar patterns, in the tradable goods sector and in labour costs. This suggests that a good part of the explanation should be country-rather than sector-specific. Moreover, inflation and growth rates are positively correlated across countries in the post-EMU period, suggesting that aggregate demand shocks are likely to play a large role. Finally, changes in import prices (including raw materials) and in the euro exchange rate, which impact differently across countries, may also contribute to the explanation.
The last factor just mentioned was emphasised recently by Honohan and Lane (2003) . They estimate a multivariate panel where the spreads of national inflation rates from the area average depend on proxies of the catch-up effect and on three macroeconomic variables: nominal exchange rate changes; the fiscal balance, and the output gap. They conclude that much of inflation divergence is attributable to the euro exchange rate, whose changes affect euro area members asymmetrically in relation to their degree of external exposure. Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004) have shown that this conclusion is somewhat sensitive to the model specification; more recently Honohan and Lane (2004) have provided further evidence in support of their earlier thesis. Exchange rate changes are, of course, one among many potential sources of asymmetric shocks among euro area countries; their importance relative to other factors remains an open question.
Two other recent papers have approached the issue using general equilibrium multi-country models of the euro area. Both of them assume the euro area is a closed economy (thus ruling out by assumption any role of the euro exchange rate) that comprises only two countries. Andres et al. (2003) , based on work by Bergin (2003) , build a model where each of the two countries produces differentiated goods traded in monopolistic competitive markets. Price discrimination occurs due to differentiated demand conditions and price adjustment costs: the key parameters in the model are the elasticity of demand and the slope of the Phillips curve, both of which are country-specific. There is no inflation persistence, only price-level stickiness. The model is calibrated so as to mimic the characteristics of the larger and less open euro area countries. The authors suggest that, in their currency area, inflation differences depend more on the characteristics of local demand than on price inertia. Finally, Benigno (2004) uses a model similar in certain respects to the previous one (two countries; monopolistic competition and price stickiness) to study alternative monetary policy rules in presence of inflation differentials. His focus is not on the causes of the differentials, but on the welfare implications of different monetary policy rules in presence of national asymmetries. 
The model
We model each national economy by means of an aggregate supply and an aggregate demand equation. 4 Our specification closely follows Woodford (2003, especially chapters 3 and 5), but is adjusted for some features of small open economies that allow us to study the interrelationship among the countries of the euro area. Aggregate supply is specified as a so-called "hybrid" Phillips curve, where consumer price inflation depends on past and expected future inflation and on the domestic output gap. The lagged inflation term measures the degree of inflation persistence. This equation contains also a "pass-through" mechanism, i.e. a direct effect of changes in the nominal exchange rate on inflation. For each country, changes in the nominal effective exchange rate depend on changes of the euro exchange rates with non euro area currencies, weighted by the countryspecific trade shares. Aggregate demand consists of an output gap equation, a function of past and expected future domestic output gaps, and a short-term real interest rate. 5 The lagged output gap term captures output persistence. The output gap also depends on the real effective exchange rate, which measures the country's external price competitiveness. Real effective exchange rates are constructed from the relevant bilateral intra-and extra-area exchange rates, weighted by the appropriate trade shares (see the Appendix for the construction of this variable in the estimation and simulation of the model). The presence of the real effective exchange rate term generates cross-country spillovers from domestic inflation in our model: excess inflation in a given country generates a real appreciation, leading to deflationary tendencies that tend to eventually reequilibrate the initial inflation differential. This mechanism plays a key role in the international adjustment mechanism within the model, as we shall see. In summary our specification is:
where the index j represents a generic country; neer and reer denote the nominal and the real effective exchange rate of each country; all other symbols are selfexplanatory. j neer Δ is equal to zero except for changes in the euro area-wide exchange rate; on the contrary, j reer changes over time also because of changes in relative prices within the currency area.
Note that, if all coefficients are equal across countries and if 1 c equals zero, the model admits a steady state where all inflation rates are equal, all real exchange rates are constant and all output gaps are zero. Re-normalising all real exchange rates to unity, the "natural" real interest rate consistent with this steady state is
. In general, neither the price level nor the inflation rate is determined by
[1] and [2] in steady state; for that one needs an appropriate monetary policy rule, determining t r . Outside the steady state, the dynamics of inflation, output and the real exchange rate for each country are driven by a combination of factors, some of them producing and amplifying, and some others reducing inflation and other differentials among countries. For example, excess inflation in country j could reduce the domestic real interest rate under a common monetary policy if inflation expectations at the relevant horizon differ across countries. In the absence of fully integrated goods and capital markets (i.e., if the relevant real interest rate for agents is given by the domestic rate), it seems reasonable to assume a strong "home bias" in the mechanism driving inflationary expectations in the national economies. In this case, the resulting lower real interest rate would amplify the original inflation differentials. Over time, however, the real exchange rate appreciation that occurs in country j produces deflationary effects on the domestic economy, which eventually drive inflation differentials back to equilibrium. Note also that, if the system starts from an initial condition where the real exchange rates are not in steady state equilibrium, a convergence process takes place during which national inflation rates temporarily differ.
We estimate the model on quarterly data from 1998:I to 2003:II, 6 using panel instrumental variables without fixed effects. We estimate equations [1] and [2] separately, yet formulate each as a panel including all 12 national countries simultaneously. 7 The estimation is unweighted, hence considering each country observation with equal weight. The choice of lag lengths followed a general-to- 6 We assume that 1998 is sufficiently close to the post-EMU regime to be included in our sample. . We calculate robust standard errors. A drawback of estimating the two blocks separately is that we assume no covariance between domestic output and inflation; this means assuming that the domestic interactions between supply and demand are sufficiently well represented by the explicit terms in equations [1] and [2] . To keep the model tractable, we have furthermore decided not to include further variables, such as fiscal policy (see, e.g., Canova and Pappa 2003) , or analyse separately country-specific and common euro area shocks. The introduction of direct inflation and output spillovers did not change the results in any noteworthy fashion, as these effects turned out to be of second order importance.
specific model search, according to which we consecutively dropped insignificant lags (starting from a more general specification of equations [1] and [2] ). The scarcity of data severely limits the degree of parameter differentiation across countries we can allow for. Given this constraint, we initially assume full symmetry across countries except for the degree of external exposure: this is achieved by using appropriate trade weights for the construction of reer j in equation [2] and letting λ differ depending on external openness. For the latter, we distinguish two groups, characterised by "low" and "high" openness, and estimate the respective λ coefficients: see details in Table 2 . This is what we call our "benchmark" model. We also explore another possible source of differentiation: the monetary policy transmission mechanism; this seems logical due to the emphasis placed by the literature on transmission asymmetries. 8 Again, for simplicity we allow for only two different country groups respectively characterised by a "weak" and a "strong" interest rate channel of monetary transmission, based on evidence by Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon (2003) , and estimate the respective values of δ. Beyond λ and δ, we detected no further statistically significant types of differentiation.
As discussed in Section 2, several authors have emphasised the fact that EMU has started with sizeable differences in price and productivity levels across countries. This could have led to a convergence process, during which countries that started from below-average price levels experience for a while above-average inflation rates and vice versa. To check this, we have estimated different model specifications including country-fixed effects, the price-level differences at the start of EMU (using estimates produced by OECD), or the time path of these deviations. . */**/*** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level respectively. The test whether α 1 +α 2 =1 cannot be rejected at the 5% level with a p-value of 0.067. Sign. denotes the p-value of the tests for significance of (1-α 1 ) or for cross-country differences. The estimates for c 2 and α 3 are obtained in a model with undifferentiated coefficients. They remain roughly unchanged in the differentiated model. Country differentiation w.r.t. δ: weak transmission in Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal (Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon 2003) . Country differentiation w.r.t. λ: Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg most open to trade (Andres et al. 2003) .
None of these proxies of initial convergence effects proved significant within our model or produced appreciable changes in the parameters estimates we are now going to present. 9 Table 2 contains the estimates. It also indicates, in its right-hand side, the values of corresponding parameters obtained in some recent papers that consider models comparable to ours (see the Appendix for a description of the data used). Both the backward and forward parameters in the inflation equation ( 1 α and 2 α )
are significantly positive and can be restricted to sum to unity based on standard significance levels (at 5 percent level α that differ across European countries; they rank Germany at the lower end with 0.04, and classify Italy as the most persistent country with an estimate of 0.55. However, their results are based on an older sample period , characterised by larger cross-country differences in inflation. Note that our point estimate (0.46) is surrounded by a rather large standard error (0.21); hence other values of 1 α located in the central region of the admissible [0, 1] range are also plausible on the basis of our results.
For the slope of the Phillips curve (parameter β ) our value of 0.09 is about half of that obtained by Smets (2003) ; however, he uses annual data, which naturally leads to larger estimates for this parameter. The pass-through coefficient in the inflation equation is equal to Table 2 ) and a range between -0.1 and -0.3 obtained by Honohan and Lane (2003) .
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The estimates of the backward and forward parameters in the output gap equation ( 3 α and 4 α ) conform less well to the theoretical priors from optimising models. We found no evidence of forward-looking behaviour here. On the contrary, the backward-looking coefficient is very precisely estimated at 0.51. In the spirit of remaining close to the data, we use this purely backward-looking formulation as our benchmark model, despite its lesser theoretical appeal. We have explored the sensitivity of the results in two alternative formulations: a purely forward-looking one and a hybrid one in which the backward-and forward-looking coefficients are restricted to sum to one.
The estimates concerning monetary policy transmission seem to confirm the earlier evidence regarding the existence of two country groups. In fact, we cannot reject in our panel the hypothesis that in the "weak interest rate channel" group δ equals zero: a result broadly consistent but more extreme than the one reported by Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon (2003) , who find that the transmission mechanism works with the expected sign in all countries. In the table we also report estimates obtained assuming a homogeneous interest rate coefficient in all countries; the order of magnitude is comparable to that in earlier papers. Concerning, finally, the elasticity to the real exchange rate across countries, we again assume two country groups, based on the degree of openness to international trade, and estimate the coefficients. Signs and relative sizes of the coefficients are broadly in accordance with earlier estimates reported in the table.
Matching the historical inflation and output differentials and analysing the sources of shocks
To get an initial idea of the overall properties of our model, Figures 3 to 6 report the impulse responses to a variety of single-period unitary shocks. The figures show profiles of inflation and output following demand (or potential output) and cost-push shocks in one country (Germany in this example) or demand and costpush shocks of equal size in all countries. 12 We show results for each of the 12 countries and for aggregate area-wide inflation and output gap, as well as the cross-country dispersion of inflation and the output gaps, measured by the simple standard deviation. We assume that monetary policy follows a simple rule of the type 1 1 5 . 1
, i.e. the short-term interest rate reacts to expected inflation in the euro area with a coefficient greater than unity in accordance with the "Taylor principle", and that the euro exchange rate is constant. We will analyse different monetary policy rules and exchange rate determination mechanisms in later sections.
Several results are worth noting. First, the model generates economically significant inflation and output differentials. Focusing first on the idiosyncratic shocks (Figures 3 and 4) we see that the disturbance in the country where the shock originates (long-short dashed line) is transmitted to the other countries in a heterogeneous fashion already in the initial quarters. Inflation dispersion tends to be larger and more long-lived than output dispersion in most cases. Area-wide average effects are generally rather short-lived. It is interesting to note that the cost-push shock produces both an increase in inflation (on impact) and an initial increase in output (developing gradually) in the home country. This result depends on the fact that the real interest rate declines on impact (note that the central bank reacts only to expected inflation at the aggregate level, such that nominal interest rates respond only very little to an idiosyncratic cost-push shock); while the deflationary effect through lower competitiveness develops more slowly. In the short run, the country subject to a cost-push shock is able to export all the deflationary output effect to the rest of the area. The impulse responses show that the adjustment process differs also across countries which had not been affected by the idiosyncratic shock initially. This pattern arises due to the assumed parameter differentiation as well as the differences in the countries' trade patterns. In this case, the countries trading relatively more with Germany are affected more strongly through changes in their real exchange rate (see, e.g., the less pronounced response of the Spanish output gap in the third panel of Figure 4 compared to those of Luxembourg and the Netherlands, which trade significantly more with Germany).
As one would expect, common shocks affect the euro area average more than idiosyncratic shocks; the latter, in turn, tend to generate large differentials but move the mean relatively little. The impulse responses of the output gap to a common cost-push shock reveal that the adjustment process differs across countries even for a common shock. Beyond the parameter differentiation, these differences are mainly due to the underlying heterogeneities in the trade linkages of countries. Accordingly, the adjustment process differs particularly strongly the countries that are more open to non-euro area trade like the Netherlands or Ireland (dotted line in the second and third panels, respectively), and as such face a stronger real exchange rate effect. Looking at area-wide average effects, common demand shocks move inflation and output in the same direction, as expected, whereas common cost-push shocks move them in the opposite direction. Note: X-axis: quarters; Y-axis: percent deviations from steady state. For the upper 6 charts, the first country mentioned in the title is depicted by a solid line, the second by a dotted, the third by a long-dashed and the fourth by a long-short-dashed line. 
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Note: The size of differentials is measured by the unweighted standard deviation of national inflation rates and output gaps. The persistence of differentials is measured by the unweighted average of the autocorrelation coefficients of national inflation and output gap differentials. Data: 1998:I-2003:II. Model: based on 400 stochastic simulations, with shocks drawn from the estimated covariance matrix of inflation and output gap residuals and from the empirical distribution of the euro exchange rate over the estimation sample.
In order to see how the model matches the relevant features of the data, we do two things. First, we simulate the model, adding residuals drawn from the distribution of the estimated residuals (based on the estimated covariance matrix) and from the observed distribution of the euro exchange rate. We use 400 stochastic replications to see if the size and the persistence of inflation and output differentials are close to those observed historically. Note that the exchange rate shock enters both equations in the model, because the nominal and real effective exchange rates both include a non-euro area component. The results, in Table 3 , suggest that the model fits the data remarkably well; data and model results for both inflation and output gap differentials, and for both their size and persistence, are very close. 13 For both inflation and the output gap, dispersion and persistence generated by the model are in fact slightly higher than in the data; this could depend on sampling characteristics -the particular realisation of shocks in the historical period being such to produce less differentials than would be the case over the long run; if so, this would suggest that the euro area will experience in 13 The size of differentials is measured through the unweighted standard deviation of national inflation rates and output gaps. Unlike in Figure 1 , where inflation was expressed in annual changes, the table reports the results for annualised quarterly inflation rates, giving rise to a somewhat larger dispersion than in Figure 1 . To measure the persistence of differentials, we report the unweighted average of the autocorrelation coefficients of national inflation and output gap differentials.
future wider differentials than those seen so far. Be that as it may, it is interesting that a simple model like ours, which includes only a minimum of cross-country differentiation (in fact, just in the degree of external exposure) and completely excludes catch-up effects at the start of EMU, has no difficulty in reproducing the observed pattern of output and inflation differentials. The model can also be used to decompose the overall size of output and inflation differentials according to types of shocks. This is done in Table 4 , where three types of shocks are considered separately: demand shocks, cost-push shocks, and euro (area-wide) exchange rate shocks. Two exercises are reported; in the first, we use the historical residuals; in the second, stochastic replications with the appropriate covariance structure (calculated as already described). The contrast between the two procedures can reveal whether the historical residuals are normally distributed, or whether they show non-normal behaviour that may have contributed to larger or smaller differentials relative to those one may expect over longer periods. 
Inflation Output gap
Using the historical shocks (22 observations) Using 400 random draws from the distribution of the historical shocks
Note: Numbers reported measure the size of differentials by the unweighted standard deviation of national inflation rates and output gaps. Upper panel: simulation of the model using the historically observed shocks. Lower panel: model simulation over 400 quarters, using random draws from the distribution of the historical shocks.
The table shows that the demand shocks play a dominant role in generating both inflation and (particularly) output gap differentials. This does not come as a surprise, considering that output and inflation differentials are positively correlated across countries over the recent years in the euro area. The cost-push shocks are second, and the exchange rate shocks third. The euro exchange rate explains about one third of the observed inflation differentials among euro area countries in 1998-2003 and about one sixth of the observed output gap differentials. In considering these numbers it should be noted that the sum of the individual shocks adds to something more than the total, because the standard deviation is a nonlinear measure of the underlying differentials and because covariances are neglected in calculating the individual contributions. A second finding is that results from random replications generate larger inflation differentials, relative to those from the historical shocks, and the share attributable to the exchange rate is smaller. This suggests that we may expect in future larger inflation differentials, and the role played by the exchange rate to be smaller, relative to the past -assuming, of course, that the covariance structures remain the same.
Sensitivity analyses of the propagation mechanism
Our next step is to see how the differentials are affected by the key parameters in the model which characterise the propagation mechanism. This is interesting because some of these parameters in the euro area are likely to change due to structural reform or to market driven structural change. For example, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy will be affected in the coming years by the harmonisation and modernisation of financial markets, presumably in the direction of more area-wide homogeneity. Similarly, flexibility-enhancing labour and product market reform, partly induced by the euro, may steepen the slope of the Phillips curve or reduce inflation persistence. By examining the impact of these parameters one can then learn something about how the intra-area differentials may evolve over time or on what reforms are needed to affect the formation and propagation of inflation and output differentials in the area in a given way.
To conduct our sensitivity exercise we calculate the impulse response of the unweighted standard deviation of the national inflation rates and summarise its shape with two numbers: the "maximum dispersion" (peak of the impulse response) and the "half life" (number of quarters it takes the cumulated impulse response to reach half of its final value). We interpret these numbers respectively as proxies of the size and the duration of the differentials, and analyse how they vary with changes in the key coefficients when the model is hit by two common shocks (demand and cost-push). We vary each coefficient from its benchmark value to plus or minus twice the estimated standard deviation, first keeping the parameters equal across all countries and later allowing for cross-country differentiation. We consider four types of parameter changes. 14 1) In the monetary policy transmission mechanism (parameterδ ); 2) In the degree of inflation persistence (parameter 1 α ); 3) In the degree of output persistence (parameter 3 α ); 4) In the Phillips curve slope (parameter β ). Figure 7 shows some results, 15 respectively under common demand and common cost-push shocks. The benchmark value is denoted by a vertical line at the centre of each chart. The two curves in each chart denote, respectively, the maximum dispersion in percent (thick line, left axis) and the duration in quarters (thin line, right axis). Shaded areas indicate parameter ranges where the model becomes dynamically unstable.
Considering the four parameters in order, we see that an increase in the value of δ (stronger monetary transmission in all countries) tends to increase both the size and the duration of inflation differentials. Intuitively, a stronger monetary transmission leads to higher inflation differentials because under a common monetary policy (same nominal interest rate) high inflation countries receive a further inflationary stimulus which amplifies the initial gap. This pro-cyclical effect increases sharply when one gets near the upper limit of the confidence region.
Inflation differentials increase sharply as inflation persistence ( 1 α ) grows only just above the benchmark value, and the model tends to become dynamically unstable. The fact that inflation differentials grow with inflation persistence is of course not surprising: large 1 α strengthen the propagation of any initial shocks. What is surprising is the extent of the increase, and the fact that dynamic instability tends to occur close to values regarded by most authors as empirically plausible. Third, a much more limited sensitivity is observed with respect to output persistence; dynamic instability emerges only close to the upper end of the confidence region of 3 α . Fourth, when the Phillips curve steepens (as one may expect with more wage and price flexibility) inflation differentials increase. In this case, however, we also see an increase in duration of the differentials as β falls close to zero. As β approaches zero, output gaps cease to have an impact on inflation, and differences in relative prices across countries can no longer be 14 An objection to our procedure is that, in an optimizing model, some sets of parameters are combinations of deep parameters so that one cannot change one and keep the others fixed without violating the Lucas critique. A micro-founded model is beyond our ambition here, but our sensitivity analyses are still a useful step, also in the sense that they can be used to indirectly gauge the likely effect of deep parameter changes. 15 Other results are reported in the working paper version of this paper, Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004) .
corrected through fluctuations of domestic output; accordingly, price levels do not return to equilibrium and are indeterminate. Note that under a demand shock the dispersion of inflation rates is zero (a demand shock has no effect on inflation if 0 = β ). Looking at all charts together, we observe that the size of inflation differentials is systematically higher, for all parameter values under a cost-push shock than under a demand shocks. Intuitively, under a cost-push shock monetary policy in our model faces a trade-off between inflation and output gap stability. In stabilising aggregate inflation, the central bank tends to destabilise the output gap temporarily. This feeds into the inflation differentials through the aggregate supply equation. We will return to this in the next section, when examining the effects of monetary policy on inflation differentials. It is interesting to note here, however, that the duration of inflation differentials does not vary much between the two experiments. In Figure 8 we show experiments where coefficients are differentiated across countries. First we differentiate the monetary transmission according to two country groups ("weak" and "strong" transmission), as in Section 4, while keeping the area-wide average δ constant and equal to the benchmark value (top panels of Figure 8 ). On its horizontal axis, the chart shows l h δ δ − , i.e. the difference between the countries with strong and weak transmission. In order to understand the chart one should first observe that, by construction, the ordinate of the two curves under no differentiation (i.e. in the left side of the charts where
) is equal to the middle value of the corresponding charts of Figure 7 . As one moves to the right, the two country groups are more and more differentiated. The chart shows that differentiation of the transmission parameters does not increase the inflation differentials much. The effect of increasing transmission equally in all countries (as shown in Figure 7 ) is greater. This result would seem to mitigate concerns that have been expressed, e.g. by Guiso et al. (1999) , that asymmetries in the transmission of monetary policy to national economies are sufficiently large to cast doubts on the viability of a "one size fits all" policy in a single European currency area. Note: The charts show the maximum dispersion of national inflation rates (thicker lines, left axis) and its half-life (thinner lines, right axis) in response to common demand (left column) and common cost-push shocks (right column). On the horizontal axis, the charts in each row vary one model parameter (indicated in the top left corner) within their 95% confidence intervals, with the estimated midpoint denoted by a vertical line.
In the second experiment, the inflation persistence parameter is varied across the confidence range in one country (France) while in the other countries 1 α is kept at zero. This experiment is interesting for a reason similar to the previous one; asymmetries in persistence (due to local indexation schemes; or to failure of expectations at the national level to adapt to the regime change -a factor stressed recently by Levin and Piger, 2004 ) may unduly exacerbate the differentials. Here, the results are very similar to those in Figure 7 : shortly beyond the benchmark value of 1 α , the system becomes dynamically unstable. Below that, the impact of differentiation is limited under demand shocks but significant under cost-push shocks, as one can appreciate by comparing the levels of the curves of the lower two panels of Figure 8 with the corresponding panels in Figure 7 . It is not so much the differentiation in persistence that matters, but its size in one or more countries, or in all.
The role of monetary policy
How does monetary policy affect inflation differentials? In the euro area, the monetary policy conducted by the ECB is geared at area-wide aggregate variables, and national variables play no role except insofar as they inform the central bank about aggregate developments. It is natural to ask how a monetary policy focused on the area as a whole affects cross-country differentials. This is the question we now address.
To have first a general idea of how monetary policy affects the euro area economy in our model Figure 9 shows the impact of a monetary policy shock on all variables of interest. The chart is just illustrative and clearly depends on the profile of the monetary shock; here we have chosen a persistent shock in the short term interest rate, with an autoregressive coefficient of 0.6, in order to mimic the policy inertia found in the literature (see e.g. Peersman and Smets, 2003) The charts suggest that the profiles of the impulses responses for the euro area output and the price level are quite similar to those found in the recent euro area transmission literature; the responses are hump-shaped, and the timing of the peak effect on the output gap (3-4 quarters) and on inflation (longer) are in accordance with that literature. The inflation and output differentials created by this monetary policy shock are modest and seem to be generated broadly speaking by two groups of countries: large ones plus some small ones, broadly mimicking the euro area, and some other small ones, where the impact of the shock tends to be less pronounced and more oscillatory.
The question we address now is how different degrees of monetary policy activism by the central bank affect the differentials, in addition to the area-wide aggregate figures. Figure 10 shows combinations of area-wide aggregate inflation (deviations from steady state) and inflation differentials that can be obtained with different values of π ϕ , the parameter on inflation in the monetary policy reaction function in our benchmark model, separately under common demand or common cost-push shocks. Aggregate inflation is measured by the integral of the absolute deviation of the impulse response of euro area inflation from steady state; hence our measure expresses how much inflation is allowed to diverge from steady state. Inflation differentials are measured by the integral of the impulse response of inflation dispersion from steady state; a higher value in the scale means larger differentials. The value of π ϕ is allowed to range between 0 and 10; the values of 1 and 1.5 are denoted in the figure respectively by a small cross and a small circle. Note: X-axis: quarters; Y-axis: percent deviations from steady state. For the 6 charts containing country results, the first country mentioned in the title is depicted by a solid line, the second by a dotted, the third by a long-dashed and the fourth by a long-short-dashed line.
All lines are positively sloped, illustrating a complementarity relation between aggregate inflation and inflation differentials: as π ϕ increases, economic outcomes move towards the origin, with fewer deviations of inflation from its long-run level and lower inflation differentials. If all countries' inflation is equally persistent (short dashed and continuous line) the set of attainable combinations is closer to the Y-axis than in the case where persistence exists in one country only, as one would expect. In sum, our model suggests that a tight control of inflation around its target unambiguously reduces inflation differentials as well. The effects of allowing monetary policy to respond to the output gap, instead, depend on the source of the shock; results not reported here show that allowing an output gap response reduces the differentials under demand shocks, but increases them under cost-push shocks. 
Alternative exchange rate models
So far we have assumed that the expected exchange rate remains constant. In this section we complete the analysis by briefly examine the implications of some alternative exchange rate determination models among those more commonly assumed: pure Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP), and UIP augmented by a risk premium.
Pure Small open economy models such as ours under rational expectations and pure UIP tend to generate indeterminate solutions; a way to restore uniqueness of equilibria is to postulate that UIP is augmented by a debt-dependent risk premium (see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2003) . The risk premium in the "augmented UIP" rule helps pin down the exchange rate level in steady state. As in Lane and MilesiFerretti (2001) we assume that the risk premium t ψ depends on the value of the euro area residents' net foreign asset position; the latter in turn depends on the exchange rate. Based on information on euro area net foreign assets and their currency denomination, we approximate Table 7 .4), more or less counterbalanced by equivalent gross liabilities. We assume that all liabilities are denominated in euro and conjecture, based on partial information, that about 80 percent of foreign assets are denominated in foreign exchange. This leads to an estimated currency mismatch in the aggregate euro area residents' financial portfolio of about 6.000 euro, or about 5 times the annual value of euro area exports (goods and services). Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, Table 8 ) estimate that in the average of OECD countries a unitary increase in the ratio of NFA to exports lowers the risk premium on domestic interest rates by 100 basis points. In our case this means that a one percent euro appreciation reduces the NFA/export ratio by 5 percent and raises the risk premium by 5 basis points. We adjusted this estimate upward to 10 basis points to take into account other components of wealth not included in net foreign assets. parameter space where stable/unique, indeterminate, or explosive solutions occur. For comparison we also show the "closed economy" case. The figure provides some interesting insights. Starting with the first row, we see that in the single closed economy case a value of π ϕ above unity (Taylor principle) is sufficient to obtain stable and unique equilibria, as well known. This is not true in a currency union; dynamic instability occurs for high values of 1 α regardless of π ϕ . In the open economy case with a constant exchange rate the indeterminacy region disappears, as one would intuitively expect -the fixed exchange rate anchors the domestic price level. However, as in the earlier case, in the currency union model the area of dynamic instability is enlarged. Moving to floating exchange rate, under pure UIP the area of indeterminacy is quite large. The currency area model under pure UIP is an extreme case from the viewpoint of stability/uniqueness: no region of our parameter space that admits stable and unique solutions. The introduction of a time-varying risk premium reduces the area of indeterminacy considerably, as noted in the literature.
A general conclusion worth noting is that in all cases the currency area model increases the region of the parameter space where dynamic instability can occur, relatively to the single economy case. This is not counterintuitive, since the currency area implies a loss of instruments relative to the number of variables to be stabilised. Another finding of interest is that the benchmark parameter values of 1 ;α ϕ π , denoted in the charts by a dot, tend to always be close to the boundaries separating the areas of indeterminacy, instability and uniqueness/determinacy, rather than being clearly placed in the interior of any of these regions. Small changes in the parameter values can make the model switch, e.g. between dynamic stability and uniqueness to instability, or to indeterminacy. Taking this into account, it would be interesting to conduct a more extensive analysis of the implications of alternative monetary policy rules and exchange rate mechanisms for the solutions of our multi-country model, also taking into account possible other mechanisms (e.g., fiscal policy) that could contribute to stabilise and anchor the solutions of the model. However, this would take us away from the main focus of this paper, and we leave it for future research.
Conclusions
Inflation and growth divergences among euro area countries are likely to remain for a while a prominent issue in European political and popular debates, for good reasons. In the euro area regional economic divergences are more likely to occur than in other currency areas. This phenomenon will probably increase once the area is enlarged to new entrants.
In this paper we propose a stylised model of the euro area economy and use it to analyse the inflation and output differentials observed across countries. Our model is able to replicate the main patterns (size, persistence) of the differentials experienced so far in the euro area. Our main findings are twofold. First, these differentials have so far been caused mainly by demand or potential output shocks (we do not distinguish between these two), and only to a lesser extent by domestic cost-push shocks and -even less -by euro exchange rate shocks. Second, inflation persistence is, under plausible parameter values, the factor that can propagate inflation differences (arising from idiosyncratic shocks or from a different transmission of common shocks) most powerfully. Other explanations that have received more attention in the literature in recent years seem to count less. In addition, we also find that a monetary policy that closely stabilises areawide inflation is likely to lead to low cross-country inflation differentials. It is important to stress that our results are positive, not normative; our model does not permit a formal welfare analysis.
An open question is whether inflation persistence is in fact an intrinsic feature of the euro area economy. On this, views are divided. Some have argued that inflation persistence is the by-product of monetary policy regimes that are unable to anchor long-term inflationary expectations.
17 If so, we should see inflation persistence decline in the coming years in most euro area countries, and in this case the size and persistence of inflation differentials should decline as well towards the levels observed in the United States. Others 18 see persistence as a more structural and long-lasting phenomenon. The estimates we have provided are not unambiguous, as we have seen. Further research will hopefully provide some answers.
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